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Jamming and the Law of
International Communications
Rochelle B. Price*
INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union began to jam Western radio broadcasts to the Soviet
Union in 1948.1 Jamming 2 has continued to be a problem since then,
though not a constant one; over the years, the level of jamming has varied
in relation to East-West tensions 3 but more particularly in consonance
with internal and external crises. 4 As the post-war international debate
concerned with virtually all aspects of modem communications has
evolved, jamming has become one focus of the free flow of information-
national sovereignty debate. Though seldom completely effective, 5 jam-
ming is a sufficiently large-scale and controversial practice to warrant
international attention 6 today, as the resumption of jamming by the Soviet
Union in 1980 demonstrates.
The prime targets of Soviet and East European jamming are the three
major Western foreign broadcast stations, the BBC's External Broadcasting
Services, the Voice of America (VOA), and Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib-
erty (RFE/RL). 7 Unlike the External Broadcasting Services, which are
known for their impartial dissemination of world news, 8 the VOA oper-
ates as the voice of the executive branch of the United States government. 9
RFE/RL differ in programming and function from the other Western
broadcast stations. While the VOA's role is to explain and present United
States institutions, culture, and official policy, Radio Free Europe, broad-
casting to Eastern Europe and Radio Liberty, broadcasting to the Soviet
Union, are strongly news-oriented and devote the bulk of their program-
ming to developments within those countries, especially matters about
which local news is often suppressed or distorted. 10
The international instruments that address the issue lend support both
to the Western view that jamming is violative of the principle of freedom
of information, a fundamental human right, and to the Eastern view that
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jamming is an appropriate legal response to foreign radio broadcasts trans-
mitted in blatant disregard of principles of national sovereignty. These
instruments do not resolve the issue legally because each side can justify
its position both in terms of the underlying theoretical debate and with
reference to these specific documents. Given the political nature of the
issue and the fact that no consensus exists as to the scope and content of
the principle of freedom of information, the best that can be hoped for is
the continued discussion of the problem in multilateral forums and the
nonbinding expressions of principle expressed in documents like the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords. 1
JAMMING AND THE DEBATE OVER FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION
At present, the policies toward jamming held by the West and the East are
straight forward and irreconcilable. For the Western nations, the widest
possible dissemination of news is an essential element of the principle of
freedom of information. 12 Thus, jamming is to be condemned in almost
all circumstances. For the Soviet Union and its satellites, jamming is jus-
tified when the content of foreign. radio broadcasts threatens national
security and morale. 13 Prior to World War II, however, both West and East
had agreed that jamming was defensible. Broadcast technology was less
sophisticated then and the right of a state, exercising exclusive sovereignty
over its territorial air space, to prevent the entry of unwanted radio waves
was recognized in all the treatises on international law. 14
The position of West and East diverged in the post-war world. Theorists
and politicians on both sides focused less on the physical trespass of radio
waves and more on the ideas themselves which could be transmitted past
the borders of any country. The West came to believe that states could not
exercise sovereignty over ideas broadcast by radio. 15 The East, however,
claimed that states had a duty to jam when these ideas criticized the
socialist order or revealed deficiencies that the leaders felt must be con-
cealed. 16 These positions mark the outlines of the debate over freedom of
information.
For the West, "freedom of information" means that people should be
able to impart their ideas throughout the world and that others should be
able to hear them. Although the slogan is new, the principles it stands for
are "the more familiar [ones] of freedom of thought, freedom of expres-
sion, and freedom of the press." 17 It is regarded by the West as a funda-
mental human right, consistent with the express concern for such rights
articulated by the United Nations. 18 Consequently, it is a right that states
may not impair, except within the most narrow limits. 19 In particular,
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because the West believes that global peace can be achieved only through
open and informed discussion, 20 a state's use of jamming to suppress radio
broadcasts violates the principle of freedom of information as the West
conceives of it.
As the Soviet Union conceives of freedom of information, it "does not
exist in the abstract, but in a particular socioeconomic context." 21 The
Soviet constitution guarantees the right to receive and impart information,
but in practice only if it promotes the development of socialism. 22 Accord-
ingly, the Soviet state has the right and the duty to protect its people from
subversive news and opinions, a form of agression, by jamming foreign
radio broadcasts, if necessary. 23 Freedom of information may be a human
right, but the implementation of that right is the responsibility of each
nation. 24 Thus the current Soviet view recalls the position taken in the
classic treatises, because freedom of information, even considered as focus-
ing on ideas and not radio waves, must give way to the prerogatives of
national sovereignty.
In practice, the Soviet Union and its East European allies condemn
freedom of information as a principle used to "provide theoretical justifica-
tion for an ideological offensive by American capitalism. . ., to support the
'right' to impose bourgeois ideology and the American way of life on
peoples in other countries."' 25 In addition, they criticize the Western
broadcast stations for seeking to gain "absolute predominance in the mat-
ter of shaping world opinion." 26 Consistent with these theories, they
continue to jam Western stations. The West, in turn, continues to broad-
cast and to denounce the jamming as insidious. Both sides have reiterated
their positions at the negotiating tables as well.
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON FREEDOM OF.
INFORMATION AND JAMMING
In the international instruments concluded on the subject since World War
II, it has been easier for nations to promulgate broad statements about
freedom of information than to agree upon the specific application of that
right to radio broadcasting and jamming. The continued participation of
the Communist countries in the multilateral discussions of freedom of
information has been a small achievement in itself toward the goal of
international understanding. Yet the Communist stance on the issues still
has little in common with that of the West. 27 Furthermore, in those instru-
ments to which both the Eastern and Western nations are signatories, the
pertinent language is often so diluted or ambiguous that both sides can find
support for their conflicting substantive interpretations. Thus the status of
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these instruments as evidence of international law is highly uncertain, and
in any event they are incapable of being enforced.
The International Telecommunications Conventions
Jamming is prohibited explicitly by the International Telecommunications
(ITC's), highly technical UN documents which govern the apportionment
and use of the world's radio frequency spectrum. 28 Every ITC since 1947
has contained a provision to the effect that "all [radio] stations, whatever
their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner so as not
to result in harmful interference to the radio services of other members." 29
The Soviet Union is a signatory to these conventions and is, theoretically,
bound by their provisions. The supervising UN agency, however, is limited
to a role of mediation, of conciliation, and purely technical accommoda-
tion, and it must be invited even to assume this role by the parties to the
dispute. Moreover, its recommendations may be rejected summarily by
either party without penalty. 30 Thus it is powerless to resolve disputes
motivated by conflicting ideologies.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The earliest instrument on freedom of information drafted under the aus-
pices of the United Nations was the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human
Rights. 31 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration provides that all people
have the right to "seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through
any media without regard to frontiers." 3 2 It is a statement of the principle
of freedom of information in the broadest possible language and no guid-
ance is provided as to scope or implementation. In addition, the strength
of Article 19 is limited by Article 29:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order, and the general
welfare in a democratic society. 33
Just as the language of the Universal Declaration is ambiguous, so too
is its status as a matter of international law. At the time of its adoption,
it was proclaimed as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations," 3 4 but that standard was not intended to be more than
hortatory, and even so, the Communist nations did not formally endorse
it until 1975 at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 35
Nevertheless, subsequent international documents have claimed that the
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Universal Declaration articulated fundamental principles of humanity
which have since become embodied in the customary practice of nations. 36
However, to assert that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights consti-
tutes an obligation for members of the international community is one
thing; the actual practice of states and their de facto recognition of the norms
expressed in it is quite another. 37
The 1950 UN Resolution on Jamming
Three UN Resolutions in 1950 set forth additional statements of the princi-
ple of freedom of information, but this time as specifically applied to the
issue of jamming. In May, 1950, the Economic and Social Council Subcom-
mission on Freedom of Information and of the Press adopted a resolution
condemning deliberate interference by the Soviet Union "with the recep-
tion of certain radio signals originating beyond [its] territory" as "a viola-
tion of the accepted principles of freedom of information," and "as a denial
of the right of all persons to be fully informed concerning news, opinions
and ideas regardless of frontiers." The Subcommission requested the Eco-
nomic and Social Council to transmit this resolution to the General Assem-
bly with a recommendation that it call upon all member governments to
refrain from such interference. 38 In August, the ECOSOC proposed a draft
resolution that referred to jamming expressly only in its preamble. Al-
though it recognized freedom of information and of the press as a funda-
mental human right, it would merely have had the General Assembly
recommend to all member states that, "when they are compelled to declare
a state of emergency, measures to limit freedom of information and of the
Press shall be taken only in the most exceptional circumstances and then
only to the extent strictly required by the situation." 39 Finally, in Decem-
ber, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 424,40 which, further
weakening the May and August versions, condemned the intentional in-
terference with radio reception by "some countries" as a violation of
freedom of information. Furthermore, the resolution invited
all governments to refrain from radio broadcasts that would mean unfair
attacks or slanders against other peoples anywhere and in so doing to con-
form strictly to an ethical conduct in the interest of world peace by reporting
facts truly and objectively; [and] to give every possible facility so that their
peoples may know objectively the activities of the United Nations in pro-
moting peace and, in particular, to facilitate the reception and transmission
of the United Nations official broadcasts. 41
These resolutions primarily reflected the Western concept of freedom of
information; the Soviet Union either abstained or voted against all three. 42
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The resolutions cited as precedent for their position both the International
Telecommunications Conventions and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and like those documents, they can be considered as non-
binding declarations of general principle. 43 Since the Soviet Union has
continued to jam foreign broadcasts, however, nations cannot claim that
the articulation in these resolutions of a Western view of freedom of
information which would prohibit jamming has since become part of cus-
tomary international law.
The Draft Convention on Freedom of Information
At approximately the same time that the 1950 resolutions applied the
principle of freedom of information retroactively, condemning past Soviet
jamming, the UN General Assembly was also seeking to implement the
principle on a broad, prospective basis. A Draft Convention on Freedom
of Information was drawn up initially at an ECOSOC conference in 1948,
and then studied and modified for ten years until it was partially adopted
by an ad hoc UN Committee. 44 Article 1 of the Draft Convention ex-
pressed the principle of freedom of information as a right which each
contracting state must secure to its nationals and to the nations of other
states lawfully within its borders. 45 Article 2, however, limited the exer-
cise of that right in detail:
1. The exercise of the freedoms referred to in Article 1 carries with it
duties and responsibilities. It may, however, be subject only to such
necessary restrictions as are clearly defined by law and applied in
accordance with the law in respect of: national security and public
order (ordre public); systematic dissemination of false reports
harmful to friendly relations among nations and of expressions
inciting to war or to national, racial, or religious hatred; attacks on
founders of religions; incitement to violence and crime; public
health and morals; the rights, honor, and reputation of others; and
the fair administration of justice.
2. The restrictions specified in the preceding paragraph shall not be
deemed to justify the imposition by any state of prior censorship
on news, comments, and political opinions and may not be used as
grounds for restricting the right to criticize the government. 46
The Draft Convention remained on the UN agenda from 1962 to 1973, but
it was never considered by the General Assembly. Finally, it was dropped
from the agenda in the 1973 session. 47
The Draft Convention was not adopted because it failed affirmatively
to define the principle of freedom of information. Instead, in final form it
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focused on the rights of governments to impose limitations upon freedom
of information. 48 Its restrictive emphasis ran counter to the affirmative
assertion of the right articulated, for example, in the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights. Yet the specific limits in Article 2 are implicit in the
more general restriction on freedom of information contained in Article 29
of the Universal Declaration. It was far easier to reach a consensus in the
earlier instrument that such a right existed than to delineate in the later
one any practical guidelines for the exercise of the right.
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 19 of the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 4 9 pro-
vides for freedom of information in the same terms as Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration, but states that the exercise of the right may be
subject to "certain restrictions," including "the protection of national
security or of public order or of public health and morals." 50 Article 2 of
the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information authorized far more
extensive restrictions, but since that document was not adopted, it never
attained the precedential value of conventional international law. The
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, however, has. Thus, although
Article 19 recognizes the principle of freedom of information, it also pro-
vides the Soviet Union with reasonable grounds on which to justify jam-
ming foreign broadcasts.
The Helsinki Accords
The most recent instrument dealing with freedom of information is the
product of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Helsinki Accords of 1975. With a view towards improving the circulation
of, access to, and exchange of information, the states participating in the
Accords agreed to:
facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to
encourage cooperation in the field of information and the exchange of infor-
mation with other countries... [and] to promote the improvement of the
dissemination of filmed and broadcast information.-. . . The participating
states note[d] the expansion of the dissemination of information broadcast
by radio, and express[ed] the hope for the continuation of this process, so
as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and aims set
forth by this Conference. 51
The United States had sought to include a provision against jamming, but
predictably failed to obtain Soviet consent. 52
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As in the other instruments, both the United States and the Soviet
Union can find support for their positions on jamming in the language of
the Accords. The West cites the language quoted above as affirming the
illegality of jamming. 53 It regards the statement in which the participants
noted the expansion of dissemination. of information as an approving
reference to the decreased jamming by the Eastern bloc which began in
1973 and lasted through 1979.54 And it infers from the next phrase, ex-
pressing hope for the continued expansion of dissemination of information
by radio, that the renewed jamming since 1980 violates the principle of
freedom of information expressed in the Accords. 5s
The Soviet Union justifies its position by a two step analysis of the
Accords. First, the language of the Accords does not require parties to
implement the fieer flow of information, but merely to facilitate it, 56 and
what that means is open to varying interpretation. More important, the
Soviet Union claims that jamming is a legal response to broadcasts which
violate the spirit and letter of Helsinki themselves-that is, where the
broadcast content does not "meet the interest of mutual understanding
among peoples and the aims set forth by the Conference." 5 7 Thus, the
Soviet Union feels it is justified in taking measures to prevent the reception
of these broadcasts within its territory.
The Helsinki Accords also suffer from the same problem as the other
international instruments in that they are not an international treaty with
binding obligations placed on the state parties. 58 The effect of the Accords
is a subject of disagreement. It is argued that the Final Act is nothing more
than "a statement of principles for the guidance of inter-state relations, a
statement of intent .... It is in truth a political rather than a legal docu-
ment." 59 But, analogies can, be made to the Universal Declaration, which,
though not a legal instrument, is certainly not devoid of any legal, political,
or moral effects. 6 0 In fact, as discussed above, it has been suggested that
some provisions of the Declaration represent customary norms of interna-
tional law. 61
The effects of the Accords, particularly in this area, will probably tend
to be political and moral. 62 Again, a comparison with the Universal Decla-
ration is suggested. This is not to say that states do not violate the Declara-
tion's provisions, but a strong political and moral basis is provided for
protest and criticism. "When a state commits itself publicly to a formula-
tion of a policy, that formulation cannot be lightly set aside, even when
not legally binding." 63 The problem here is that the Soviet Union does not
feel that either the Final Act or general expressions of the principle of
freedom of information prohibits jamming, as the renewal of jamming in
1980 emphasizes. Still, the fact that such issues have been discussed in a
multilateral forum means that states have had to recognize that these
issues are not purely internal matters, and Soviet claims of non-interfer-
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ence in domestic affairs are not as powerful in light of their participation
in the multilateral discussions. 64
CONCLUSION
The East-West discussion of jamming has evolved from consideration of
the problem as a purely jurisdictional issue to a question of the scope and
content of the principle of freedom of information. But even with this
common approach, the East is still jamming Western foreign radio broad-
casts and feels that this practice is consistent with generally recognized
principles of international law, including the principle of freedom of infor-
mation, as incorporated into the international instruments discussed
above. These instruments contain only non-binding expressions of princi-
ple which may, over time, exert a stronger influence on actual state prac-
tice. Still, their legal effect has been and is likely to be weakest during the
times it is needed most, times of tension or internal political crisis. Insofar
as there has been an international condemnation of jamming, its source is
moral, not legal.
As long as the Eastern focus is on the content of foreign broadcasts
while the West's concern is with the theoretical question of the existence
of a right to freedom of information, the jamming question is unlikely to
be resolved by legal solutions. When the West talks about ephemeral
notions of fundamental rights and freedoms, it is talking past the Soviet
Union which is unwilling to focus on the exercise of the right in the
abstract, divorced from the impact of the exercise of the right on the people
over whom it is sovereign. Without a binding answer to the jamming
question or even a consensus on the scope and content of the principle of
freedom of information, the practice of jamming will remain a political
issue, responsive to the ebb and flow of East-West relations and to the
internal crises of the socialist bloc.
NOTES
I Jamming involves the deliberate effort by a state to prevent a potential radio audience
from hearing certain broadcasts. The jamming state transmits signals at the same frequency
as the broadcast. Interference generated by jamming can be directed at either of the two
components which comprise a broadcast signal: the "skywave" or the "groundwave."
Skywave jamming requires powerful transmitters which are located as far from the
intended audience as is the broadcaster. The jamming signal is radiated into the ionosphere,
which reflects it back to earth across the path of the broadcast skywave. This technique is
effective to block out broadcast signals over large areas.
Groundwave jamming requires a cluster of less powerful transmitters located in the
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vicinity of the intended audience. The jamming signal is radiated directly at the audience.
This technique is effective for blocking out broadcast signals to urban areas.
The Soviet Union utilizes two types of interference. The more common is "noise jam-
ming" which is a buzzing or whirring sound, often interrupted at intervals by identification
markers, usually Morse code signals. These markers help the jammers to coordinate their
efforts. The less common type is "major jamming," which consists of a distorted voice or
music transmitted on the same frequency as the jammed program. See D. ABSHIRE, INrERNATION-
AL BROAocAsTING: A NEW DIMENSION OF WESTERN DIPLOMACY 48-49 (1976); see also Varis, The
Control of Information by jamming Radio Broadcasts, 5 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 170 (1970).
2 VOICE OF AMEIUCA, JAmMING 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as JAMMING].
3 For purposes of simplicity, this article will analyze jamming from the context of the
United States and the Soviet Union, but naturally within each bloc there may be different
views.
4 Agsmas, supra note 1, at 48. Jamming of the official U.S. broadcast station, Voice of
America, began in 1948 when Cold War tensions ran especially high over the West Berlin
issue. In 1956, jamming was briefly relaxed during Khrushchev's visit to Great Britain, and
only Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty were jammed. The Hungarian and Suez crises brought
renewed jamming, lasting until 1963. Jamming was again stopped by the Soviet Union in 1963
with the entry into force of the Test Ban Treaty, but was resumed within hours of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Diplomatic efforts to stop the jamming proved futile. On
the eve of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Soviet Union again
ceased jamming most Western broadcasts. Jamming resumed in 1980 with the invasion of
Afghanistan and the Polish crisis.
In the past, Soviet allies followed its lead closely. Even today some of them still join the
Soviet Union in jamming both the VOA and RFE/RL (e.g., Bulgaria and Poland). But others,
such as Czechoslovakia, jam only RFE/RL; the German Democratic Republic and Romania
do not jam at all. See id.; JAMMING, supra note 2, at 2-3; M. WHITEMAN, 13 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1033-34 (1967).
5 Intense jamming can drive away listeners, but even in the areas of greatest interference,
some signals do get through both skywave and groundwave jamming. Reception is often
better in rural areas. In addition, a phenomenon known as "twilight immunity" in the late
afternoon causes skywave jamming to be ineffective. Jamming can also be combated by
saturation broadcasting: as many transmitters as possible are coordinated to broadcast at
different frequencies. ABSHIE, supra note 1, at 48; see also JAMMING, supra note 1, at 1.
6 It is estimated that the Soviet Union spends 250-300 million dollars a year on jamming-
six times the cost of its international broadcasts and three times the expense of the original
broadcast. This is more than the combined operating budgets of the VOA and RFE/RL.
AHSNIRE, supra note 1, at 49; Bethel, Propaganda Warts, HARPER'S, May 1982, at 19-20.
7 Dornberg, Voice of America: News is What the Listeners Crave, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 23, 1982,
at 15A, col. 1.
8 D. BROWNE, INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING: THE LIMIrs OF THE LIMInsS MEDIUM 179 (1982).
The BBC's External Broadcasting Services have been in operation since the late 1920's. For
the first six years, it broadcasted an "Empire service" to English speaking listeners in Great
Britain's colonies, protectorates, and commonwealth partner states. The External Services
operate under the same Royal Charter and share the same director-general as the BBC. Under
the Charter, the External Services are guaranteed full independence. Id. at 161; ABSHIRE, supra
note 1, at 23.
9 The Voice of America started broadcasting in February, 1948. It is administered by
United States Information Agency. The VOA is charged with three tasks: "to serve as a
reliable, objective source of news, to present U.S. policy, and to portray American society."
ABSHIRE, supra note 1, at 27.
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10 Id. at 30. RFE/RL's original purpose was quite different. Both stations began broadcast-
ing in the late 40's and early 50's with an emphasis on "rollback" and "liberation," that is
turning back the tide of Communism and freeing the peoples trapped behind the Iron
Curtain. This emphasis was revised during the 1960s, when polemic gave way to straight
news coverage.
Recently, the future of RFE/RL was uncertain; both stations came under strong congres-
sional attack in the early 1970s when it was disclosed that they were not in fact privately
funded (the CIA covertly provided 90 percent of RFE's financing and all of RL's). The
Congressional Research Service, the U.S. Attorney General and a Special Presidential Com-
missioner on International Broadcasting each prepared extensive studies which suggested
improvements, but uniformly commended the past performance of the stations.
In response, Congress established the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) to over-
see the operations of the stations. See Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, 22
U.S.C. §§ 2871-78 (1976). Funding is now openly provided by the U.S. government. The BIB
makes grants from the appropriated funds to the two stations, which are private, non-profit
corporations. The BIB also reviews their mission, assesses the quality and effectiveness of
their broadcasts, and reports on whether the grants are used in a manner not inconsistent with
broad U.S. foreign policy objectives. The BIB reports to the President and Congress. The
Secretary of State provides it with information on U.S. foreign policy (rather than "policy
guidance," as is the case with the VOA). Id. at 30-35; BROWNE, supra note 8, at 142.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 31-37 & 51-64.
12 See Leary, The Implementation of the Human Rights Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act: A Preliminary
Assessment, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TH HEsINyu ACCORD, 140-141) (T. Buer-
genthal ed. 1977).
13 Telephone conversation with the Press Officer, Soviet Embassy in Washington (Sep-
tember 29, 1982).
14 See, e.g., i D. O'CoNeNu., INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (1965); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 529 (8th ed. 1955).
15 Se Lopez, Report on Freedom of Information, 16 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 12) at 3-4,
U.N. Doc. E/2426 (1953); see also Leary, supra note 12, at 140.
16 The Soviet position derives not only from socialist rule over the last sixty-five years,
but is also in large measure reflective of the historical Russian attitude. Even though Soviet
leaders claim to be quite free of the past, Karl Marx once said: "Men make their own history,
but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the
past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the
living." M. SCHWARTZ, THE FOREIGN POUCY OF THE USSR: DoMEsTnc FACTORS 79-87 (1975). Some
of the character traits which link the Soviet regime to its Tsarist roots are
suspicion and apprehension of foreigners, secretiveness, obsession with espionage, and
hypersensitivity to foreign criticism.... Very much like its Tsarist predecessors, the
Soviet regime is saddled with two basically inconsistent attitudes toward the outside
world. While it has, since its inception, felt itself to be a harbinger of a new, progres-
sive, morally superior socio-economic order, the Kremlin leaders have been very much
aware of the hollowness of their claims. It is the tension produced by the gap between
self-image and reality which lies at the root of its neurotic attitude toward the West.
Id.
17 See Lopez, supra note 15, at 2.
18 See id. at 6-10.
19 Se Leary, supra note 12, at 140.
20 See PRESIDENTIAL STUDY COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING, THE RIGHT TO
KNOW 7 (1973).
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21 Leary, supra note 12, at 140.
22 Id. at 141; Lopez, supra note 15, at 3.
23 See ABSHIRE, supra note 1, at 50; BROWNE, supra note 8, at 23; JAMMING, supra note 2, at 2.
The idea that foreign broadcasts are a form of aggression was expressed by the Polish delegate
to the United Nations during the 1959 debate on jamming. He stated that each country has
the sovereign right to defend itself against this form of aggression, just as it has the right to
prevent opium smuggling, the sale of pornographic literature or the traffic in persons. See L.
MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA: ITS LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIrc CONTROL 86 (1958).
24 See Tedin, 7"he Development of the Soviet Attitude Toward Implementing Human Rights Under the U.N.
Charter, 5 RivuE DEs Dxorrs DE L'HoMiE 399 (1972).
25 V. Korokeinkov, What's Behind the "Freedom of Information" Concept, INTl' AFFAIRS, Feb. 1982,
at 105.
26 V. Goshchin, Formula of Ideological Expansion, 9 NEw TIMEs 17 (1976).
27 See Lopez, supra note 15, at 4.
28 ee JAMMING, supra note 1, at 2. The ITC's are negotiated under the auspices of the
International Telecommunications Union, a specialized U.N. agency with a membership of
more than 146 members responsible for the development of the law of global communica-
tions. The administration, enforcement and interpretation of this body of law is handled by
the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). ee Note, Radio Propaganda in the Conterts
of International Regulation and the Free flow of Information as a Human Right, 1 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 139,
159-60 (1979).
29 JAMMING, supra note 2, at 2; see MARTIN, supra note 23, at 86; 13 WHrTEMAN, supra note 4,
at 1030-31.
30 ee Note, supra note 28, at 163.
31 See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CAsES AND MATERIALS
808 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL LAW CASEBOOK].
32 G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948);see also AEsHME, supra note
1, at 50; BROWNE, supra note 8, at 24.
33 G.A. Res. 217, supra note 32.
34 Report on the Developments in the Field of Freedom of Information Since 1954, 31
U.N. ESCOR (Provisional Agenda Item 10) at 10, U.N. Doc. E/3443 (1961).
35 See INTERNATIONAL LAw CASEBOOK, supra note 31, at 808.
36 ee, e.g., R. LILIUCH & F. NEwAN, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
POLICY 65-66 (1979).
37 Id.
38 See 13 WHrrEMAN, supra note 4, at 1037-38.
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